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A commentary on
Did the US response to the marathon
bombings help or harm security?
by Peleg K, Shenhar G. Front Public Health
(2014) 2:10. doi:10.3389/ fpubh.2014.00010
On Monday, April 15, 2013, several hours
into the running of the world renowned
Boston Marathon, two bombs exploded
seconds apart at the crowded finish line.
Three spectators died in the initial explo-
sions, including an 8-year-old boy. Over
250 people were injured, many looking
more like they were on the streets of Bagh-
dad than in Boston. Single and double
amputations, shrapnel wounds, and a side-
walk slick with bright red blood set the
scene for one of the worst acts of terror-
ism on US soil since the 9–11 attacks. While
not comparable to the magnitude of deaths
and injuries inflicted on that terrible day in
2001, this type of “homegrown radicalized”
terror has been thought to be a harbin-
ger of events to come. And so, the issue
of how our emergency response services
can be expected to react and respond to
similar events in the future is a topic of
legitimate discussion. What is the proper
balance to strike between ensuring secu-
rity and imposing restrictions on civil
society?
In their article, Peleg and Shenhar, our
Israeli colleagues, question the decisions
taken by emergency response authorities
at the local, state, and Federal levels in
response to the Boston Marathon bomb-
ings (1). They suggest that the law enforce-
ment response may have been an over-
reaction, resulting in greater harm than
good. They note the near complete shut-
down of the city of Boston, and the
shelter in place order given to tens of
thousands of residents, as incentives that
demonstrate how easy it can be to dis-
rupt civil society. The experiences of the
Israeli civil and defense authorities pro-
vide important lessons for our own pre-
paredness and response efforts. In this case,
however, the arguments presented by the
authors are not completely valid in describ-
ing the situation faced by Boston area local
authorities responding to this event. These
events are relatively rare occurrences in the
United States. A show of force, and exer-
tion of control, is not unexpected. More-
over, the continuous media cycle, with con-
stant attention paid to the latest head-
line grabbing news, is a part of the cul-
ture. We have grown to accept such con-
stant drumming – whether it is focused
on terror, or that latest reports of bad
weather.
With regards to the emergent manage-
ment of the event, the authors conflate
the responsibilities of local and regional
response authorities with those of the US
government in responding. For students
of incident management and response,
it is important to call out the distinc-
tions between a national and a local and
state response. The approximately 1000
National Guard present in Boston, were
primarily used to secure the Marathon race
route, and were not federalized (2). The
city of Boston and its surrounding com-
munities were not “secured by thousands
of troops,” as the authors contend. The
National Guard elements remained under
the distinct authority of the Governor of
Massachusetts. So, in fact, this was not
really a “US Response,” but a local and
state effort. By law and convention, all dis-
asters are managed locally, with federal
support, if required or requested. While
there was a significant FBI response, they
came in support of local law enforcement
authorities.
The second point to be made relates to
the notion of resilience – what it is and how
are communities defined as “resilient”?
The authors suggest that on account of
the large scale dragnet imposed upon the
city, and the closure of key transporta-
tion assets, the city’s core functions were
“disrupted. . . on a massive scale.”Does dis-
ruption of service necessarily equate with
lack of resilience? The citizens of Boston
would probably argue otherwise. After all,
their“Boston Strong”campaign, supported
by the city’s two landmark sports fran-
chises, the Boston Red Sox, and the Boston
Bruins, helped to capture the sentiment of
those affected by the attacks, and demon-
strated the resolve to move ahead and begin
the healing process (3). Moreover, from a
health and medical response perspective,
the actions and decisions taken by citi-
zens and first responders at the scene of
the bombings, and by medical staff assem-
bled at Boston’s premier medical institu-
tions, saved many lives and reduced the
morbidity from injuries sustained by vic-
tims of the bombings. Life saving maneu-
vers were performed by men and women,
in and out of uniform, lining the site of
the race finish, without regard for per-
sonal safety. The application of tourniquets
was highlighted as a critically important
intervention, as was the rapid implemen-
tation of hospital emergency operations
plans (4, 5).
In the ongoing evolution of the science
of disaster medicine and crisis response, we
will continue to use language and phrases
that may mean different things to different
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audiences at different times. And as prac-
titioners in the field, it is our responsibility
to choose our language wisely. Like the
notion of “surge capacity” before it, the
use of the term “resilience” has become
ubiquitous, and indeed may not always be
relevant to the issues being discussed. In
the Peleg and Shenhar article, the notion
that the response to the bombings may
have been harmful really does not take into
account evidence of the many successes
involved in the law enforcement, health,
medical, and community responses that
sprung into action.
In answering the question posed at the
outset of this piece – what do we mean
when we say“resilience” – Boston’s own Dr.
Leonard Marcus, in his extensive work on
the role leadership plays in emergency pre-
paredness and response, notes the causal-
ity linking “bad leadership” to becoming a
“public health risk factor” (6). If we agree
with this assumption, then it stands to rea-
son that good leadership builds resilience.
So what we are really exploring here are
the decisions taken by authorities respon-
sible for the consequence management of
the Boston Marathon bombings. Were the
right response strategies put in place? Did
the means justify the ends? It is evident that
the law enforcement efforts resulted in the
timely capture of the perpetrators. And the
robust health and medical response, both
on-scene and at Boston’s hospitals, limited
the degree of suffering sustained by victims
of the attack. In the United States, where
these events thankfully remain infrequent
occurrences, what lessons can be applied to
future events? In examining the responses
in Boston, can we say that there was effec-
tive leadership and management of civic
duties such that restrictions on civil soci-
ety were kept to a minimum, while the
public’s confidence in returning to partic-
ipate in Boston’s open, civic society were
enhanced? It is apparent that the answer is
a resounding “yes.”
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